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Introduction:

Stemming largely from the studies by Robert Putnam,1 the last decade
has been marked by a significant increase in research focused on social capital
and trust. These studies have varied from sociological evaluations to economic
analyses and have almost all found that levels of social trust play a critical factor
in determining the social health, economic strength, and government efficiency in
communities and nation states. The vast majority of these studies have explored
the effects of increased social trust. While I recognize the importance of these
works, I submit that understanding the means of creating social trust is just as
essential.
This paper’s theory posits that nations struggling from chronically low
levels of social trust can in some cases, import trust through facilitating
investment to domestic business from foreign companies. I hypothesize that this
foreign investment to private companies legitimizes those private companies in
the eyes of potential domestic investors, thereby increasing domestic fiscal
relationships and eventually, general social trust. By testing this hypothesis, I
hope to shed light on the debate concerning domestic market strategies,
particularly concerning developing nations. If nations can if fact ‘import’ trust
through opening their domestic financial sectors to the international market, this
research should serve as a strong argument in favor of such policies.
This study consists of a survey experiment using North Korean refugees
living in South Korea and citizens of the Republic of India. Subjects were
randomly assigned a hypothetical investment opportunity and asked how much
1

Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press; see also Putnam, Robert D. 2001. Bowling Along:
The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Touchstone Press.
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money they would be willing to invest in one of three businesses (one that had
received no investment, domestic investment, or foreign investment). I have also
included a brief series of regression analyses on the North Korean refugee data
in order to better understand their background.
Through the application of these different treatments, I find that the effect
of foreign investment on North Korean refugees’ and Indians’ fiscal trust is either
negligible or inconclusive; the results from the Indian sample indicate that
investment treatments have no substantive effect and the North Korean sample
was too small to yield any statistically significant results. However, some
additional testing shows that even these conclusions may be invalid.
Section one of this paper explores the existing literature relating to trust
and social capital and lays out my theory on importing trust; section two explains
the background and experimental designs for both the North Korean refugee and
Indian samples; section three analyzes the experimental outcomes of both of
these samples; section four presents the implications of my findings, and section
five contains the results of a separate quantitative regression analysis, meant to
further explore the data collected during the North Korean experiment.

1: Trust, Social Capital, and the “Importing Trust” Theory
Trust:
Before exploring social capital theory, it is important to understand trust,
which lies at the heart of social capital. Trust is a broad and complex concept that
covers many areas of study; economists, political scientists, financial analysts,
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sociologists, and even those in medicine have recognized the importance of
trust. 2 However, each of these fields defines trust in different ways.
The inherent complexity of defining trust becomes apparent by looking at
simple, everyday activities. For instance, by driving to the bank to deposit money,
one exercises a variety of different types of trust: trust in the functionality of the
automobile, trust in the bank as an institution, trust that the teller will not pocket
the money, trust that the check will not bounce, and trust that if any of the items
one has trusted fails to perform, one will receive some form of compensation
(possibly by pursuing remedial action through the court system).
While there are many varieties of trust, it is important to select one
concrete definition, as any attempt to identify and measure trust (which is
necessary for sound quantitative analysis) on all of its levels is bound to be
vexing if not fruitless. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus primarily on social
trust, or, simply put, the trust that one person has towards another person or
group of people. This interpersonal trust has profound effects on the functionality
of societies, and while it is still difficult to accurately define social trust, it is the
type of trust with the most robust set of statistical indicators and, thus, has been
studied the most by those interested in social capital theory.
In general, confidence, or trust, can develop in two ways: moralistically or
strategically. While both lines of development typically result from experience and
knowledge, these varieties are different in that moralistic trust is positive in
nature, while strategic trust is normative. Essentially, moralistic trust suggests
2

Hummels, Harry and Hans E. Rosendaal. 2001. Trust in scientific publishing. Journal of
Business Ethics 34 no. 2. 87-8.
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that some people employ trust merely because they feel that they should trust
others. Uslaner states,
Moralistic trust is a value that rests on an optimistic view of the world and
one’s ability to control it. Moralistic trust is not a relationship between
specific persons for a particular context. If the grammar of strategic trust is
“A trusts B to do X”,3 the etymology of moralistic trust is simply “A trusts.”4
It is only through this additional definition of trust that social phenomena
like civic engagement can be explained.5 This moralistic trust is not inherently
religious or spiritual, although beliefs concerning how one should treat others
regardless of past experience are common in many religions.
As opposed to moralistic trust, which is more of a belief or stance than a
calculated decision, strategic trust lends itself to more scientific research
concerning cause and effect relationships. It is a statement concerning what
people should expect other people to do. Strategic trust is inherently easier to
quantify and measure. Because of this, and because the effects of moralistic and
strategic trust are closely correlated, the results of this study will mostly reflect
levels of strategic trust. It is important to note, however, that although this
definition is easier to test, defining trust primarily as a function of rational choice
limits validity.

3

Hardin, Levi. “A State of Trust”; Trust and Trustworthiness. As cited in Farrel.
Uslaner, Eric M. Varieties of trust. Working paper for the European Journal of Political
Research.
5
Uslaner, Eric M. Varieties of trust. Working paper for the European Journal of Political
Research.
4
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Social trust is typically defined as an individual’s confidence in another’s
actions based on prior experience and information concerning that individual.6
This trust gives an individual a reasonable expectation for specific outcomes. In a
social sense, it garners confidence in an individual that other individuals will act
in a certain way given certain circumstances.
The gradual development of social trust builds a confidence that allows
people to engage in activities that, without a set of somewhat reliable
expectations, would be too risky.7 Trust is therefore a strategic action that
involves rational choice. Coleman and others have already covered the detailed
mechanisms of this rationality (the nuances of which will not be covered in this
paper) and conclude that trust is a process in which net risk of an action is
outweighed by the benefits of cooperation.8
Social Capital Theory:
the modern theories concerning the value and effect of social capital have
developed based off of these basic definitions of social trust that . Stemming
largely from Robert Putman’s book Making Democracy Work, the social sciences
have seen a significant increase in the study of social capital in the last decade.9
Generally accepted as legitimate, these studies have shown that the ability for
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Offe, Claus. 1999. Trust and Knowledge, Rules and Decisions: Exploring a Difficult
Conceptual Terrain. In Mark Warren, ed., Democracy and Trust. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
7
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8
Coleman, James. 1990. Chapter 5; see also Mayer, Roger C., James H. Davis, and F.
David Shoorman. 1995. An integrative model of organizational trust.
9
Boix, Carles and Daniel Posner. 1996. Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert
Putnam's 'Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.’ Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs Publication.
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members of a community to interact with each other (a form of social capital) and
the social phenomena that perpetuate such an ability (trust) to be important
building blocks in the development of a functional economy and sound society.
Putnam explains this relationship by stating,
Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a
substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and
networks of civic engagement. Social capital here refers to features of
social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.10
Social trust is an important component of social capital, and the level of
social trust in a region has significant influence on the development of financial
markets;11 social trust minimizes transaction-cost by building a set of
expectations that allow people to engage in activities that, without a set of
somewhat reliable expectations, would be too risky.12 Having trust in someone or
something is therefore a strategic action that involves rational choice; it is a
process in which net risk of an action is outweighed by the benefits of
cooperation.13 This increased incentive to cooperate leads to greater and
stronger fiscal relationships and consequentially, more robust financial markets.

10

Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.172.
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Coleman, James. 1990. Chapter 5; see also Mayer, Roger C., James H. Davis, and F.
David Shoorman. 1995. An integrative model of organizational trust.
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Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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David Shoorman. 1995. An integrative model of organizational trust.
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This conclusion is convincing and is supported by experimental studies,14
but the mechanisms through which such literature attempts to explain the
development of trust itself are relatively weak. Putman and others argue that the
“social trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources—
norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement.”15 In attributing the
development of trust to these two variables, these theories seem to have a
difficult time finding the actual root causes of trust itself; explaining societal trust
(the willingness to work with each other) using habits of cooperation is somewhat
circular and fails to address the core questions. Likewise, civic engagement may
in fact be a causal factor in the development of trust, but how did civic
engagement develop without trust in the first place?
In response to the holes in the above literature, there has recently been a
tide of theories that attempt to explain the root causes of trust. They argue that
Putnam’s theory appears to have confused the origins of trust with its effects.
Their studies and analyses indicate that trust is maintained and developed
through institutional transaction and fiscal relationships.16 This view is supported
by experimental data in the studies of societal cooperation by Henrich et. al.17
I assert that both theories are inter-compatible. This paper recognizes the
merits of both arguments and finds it reasonable to accept implications of both
14

Casieri, Arturo, Concetta Nazzaro, and Luigi Roselli. Trust building and social capital
as development policy tools in rural areas. An empirical analysis: the case of the LAG
CDNISAT.
15
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 171.
16
Hardin, Levi. “A State of Trust.” Trust and Trustworthiness. As cited in Farrel.
17
Henrich et. All. 2003. Economic man in cross-cultural perspective. 1. (These studies
are primarily concerned with cooperation, but recognize social capital such as trust as
well.)
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theories. The relationship between social capital and the growth of financial
markets is inherently endogenous; trust is a necessary component of all fiduciary
relationships, but increased trust is also an inevitable outcome of nearly all such
relationships. It is with this understanding that I add to the existing literature
concerned with the sources of trust.
Foreign Direct Investment- “Importing Trust”:
Building on the conclusions in the above literature concerning variables
that increase social trust, I suggest that countries that experience an increase in
foreign investment (FDI) to private corporations and businesses will also see an
eventual increase in social trust and general social capital. While the idea that
increased fiduciary relationships can act as a catalyst in increasing social trust is
not new,18 my theory suggests that nations with low levels of social trust can
“import” trust from other nations by facilitating increased foreign investment.
Quantitative analysis by Hixson, Jackson, and Thorley show that nations
that see large increases in FDI also see increases in social trust three or four
years later; the increases in FDI foster greater fiduciary relationships, which
research has shown eventually leads to more fiduciary trust in the participants of
these relationships. Such increases in fiscal trust eventually lead to increases in
general social trust. In addition to quantitative analysis, the above literature also
provided anecdotal evidence of the relationship between trust and FDI through a
comparative analysis of Belarus and Hungary, and showed that Belarus, which
saw significant increases in FDI after the dissolution of the USSR, also saw 75%
18
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increases in social trust, while Hungary, which had a decrease in FDI, actually
lost social capital over the same time period.19
The relationship proposed above is explained through two causal
mechanisms: (1) that the existence of foreign investment in a company is
perceived as a sign of legitimacy by domestic investors and will increase the rate
of fiduciary transaction, which increases trust, and (2) that fiduciary relationships
such as investment, always employ institutions (such as contract agreements or
financial stipulations,) which also increase trust.
While the testing in the above literature yielded statistically significant
support for the Importing Trust Theory, the authors had difficulty overcoming
problems associated with the inherently endogenous relationship between trust
and investment. They employed mechanisms such as a time lag between the
variables to account for this problem, but the testing left the questions concerning
FDI and trust only partially answered.
This paper represents an attempt to overcome those problems and does
so through testing the first causal mechanism in the Importing Trust Theory:
increased legitimacy. This mechanism is fairly straightforward: when a domestic
investor is assessing any given investment opportunity, he or she will likely look
for indications that a business was and will continue to be successful. Often,
these indicators are based on an individual’s prior experience with the company
or those that are running the company. However, in the absence of prior
indications of investment security, foreign investment plays an important role in
19

Hixon, Nate, Scott Jackson, and Dane Thorely. 2011. Importing trust: Increasing
domestic social capital through foreign direct investment. Working Paper, Brigham
Young University.

9

legitimizing recipient businesses. Generally, if a company receives an investment
from a foreign company or individual, it has to have shown proof that it was worth
investing in. While this proof is not necessarily personally connected with the
potential investor, domestic investors will realize the implications and therefore
be more likely to trust the company with their money. For example, if a foreign
firm invests in a Ugandan business, the foreign firm tacitly acknowledges its trust
in that local business or the business’ potential. Local investors can observe the
trust relationship between the local business and the foreign corporation in such
a way that foreign investment serves as a positive signal to potential domestic
investors. With their confidence bolstered by the trust that the foreign firm has in
the local business, investors should be more willing to financially back the local
business.
2. Experimental Design
The survey experiment in this paper was designed in order to expand the
results of the above study by focusing on just the one mechanism in the trust
imports theory. Making use of a hypothetical investment situation, North Korean
refugees and Indian natives were asked to answer questions relating to their
willingness to invest in a local business. Though a survey approach may seem
simplistic, it provides sufficient insight into the topic of how foreign investment
influences individuals’ investment behavior. There are, of course, shortcomings
to such an approach, but it allowed for a greater number of subjects given the
limited amount of time and resources available to conduct the research.

10

I chose to survey North Korean refugees and Indians for entirely different
reasons. The data provided by surveying North Koreans is not only extremely
unique, but potentially very telling as to how a nation emerging from an isolated
authoritarian regime would react to exposure to the international market. These
refugees grew up in one of the most isolated dictatorial nations in the world
(North Korea) and are now living in one of the most capitalist (South Korea). I
chose to survey the Indian sample because it gives context in which to
understand the Korean group and because India is a developing nation that has
been exposed to international investment for some time. Indians were also
chosen because they were the most cost efficient sample available through the
survey method I employed, Amazon’s MTurk,20
Due to minor variances in survey design as well as probable cultural
differences, I present the background, design, and results of each sample
separately.
North Korean Refugee Sample Group:
The North Korean refugee sample used for this research consisted of 84
recently defected21 North Korean refugees (27 males and 57 females) living in
Seoul, the South Korean capital, and Daejon, a large city located about 170
kilometers south of Seoul. Limiting the sample pool to these two areas may leave
some large demographic holes in my data, but I have seen no indication that
those refugees living in my sample regions differ from the rest of the general

20
21

Mturk.com; A detailed analysis of the MTurk program is given later in this article.
The average refugee had defected seven years before this study was conducted.
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population. In fact, the vast majority of North Korean refugees live in Seoul, with
a large portion of the remaining refugees living in Daejon, Daegu or Busan.
Recently, sharp increases in North Korean studies have made the known
refugee population in South Korea somewhat of a valuable resource for
research. The refugees have realized this, and thus, most of them have begun to
become more reluctant to work with academics. Because of the difficulty in
recruiting these refugees, I chose to partner with Saejowi-TOOK, a prominent
Seoul-based NGO focused on promoting Korean reunification and refugee
assimilation.22 Although TOOK is a small organization, they have extensive
political and social connections that allowed us to access the North Korean
refugees observed in this experiment.
Partnering with TOOK likely had some effects on the type of subjects that
are observed in the experiment. Because the entire sample consisted of TOOK
constituents, it is not a random sample. While TOOK is an open-doors
organization, the vast majority of their constituents are female and do not work
full-time. This is reflected in my sample, where almost seventy percent of the
individuals are female. This particular demographic may seem crippling to the
validity of the experimental outcomes, but the North Korean refugee population
living in South Korea is also overwhelmingly females who do not work full time.
Another potential limitation is the fact that those that associate themselves with
TOOK or take advantage of the health centers may be more willing to admit or
expose their North Korean origins, which can be socially taboo in South Korea.
While my sample is not perfectly representative, it is close enough to allow us to
22

A description of Saejowi-TOOK and their goals can be found at saejowi.org
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make inferences concerning the population. Also, because the control and
treatment were administered randomly,23 all possibly confounding coefficients in
the sample were controlled for.
Surveys were administered in one of two ways: they were either given to
refugees attending the classes, seminars, or meetings organized by TOOK or
they were given out at the TOOK North Korean Refugee Health Clinics located in
medical centers in Seoul and Daejon. About half of the Seoul surveys and all of
the Daejon surveys were given at these health clinics. Surveys were
administered by TOOK employees, all of whom were trained in giving the survey
but not informed of the theory or the desired outcome of the research. None of
the surveys were administered orally, although the option was given to anyone
who wanted it. I do have some concerns that the survey administrators,
particularly those at the health clinics, may have influenced individuals’
responses. While there no reason to believe the sample was contaminated,
Koreans, particularly North Koreans, are very conscience about doing well on
tests and may have pressured administrators to help them find the “right” answer
to the more difficult questions in the survey, possibly the hypothetical.

North Korean Refugee Experimental Design:
Each North Korean refugee was randomly given one of two surveys, either
the control or the treatment.24 In each version of the survey, the respondent was
23

Testing indicates that randomization was balanced.
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presented with a basic hypothetical situation: A businessman that the respondent
does not know is looking to expand his business, which has grown over the past
two years. He promises to give a three hundred percent return on any investment
that the respondent chooses to give. The subject was told that he or she has
recently inherited 50,000,000 Korean Won (roughly 50,000 American Dollars)
from a relative and is given the opportunity to invest any part—or none—of that
money (see below).
Control Hypothetical:
“A local business has grown over the last two years. The business wants to continue to
expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in the business. Imagine that you have
recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much of this money would you be willing to
invest in this business? The business promises a 300% return on your investment.”

The control paragraph presents only the information given above. The
treatment paragraph differs slightly. It builds on the exact wording of the control
paragraph, but adds a sentence describing how the businessman has received
investment from an international firm and that this international firm now has
some measure of control over the local business (see below).
Treatment Hypothetical 1: International Investment
“A local business has grown over the last two years. During that time this business received a
large investment from an international firm, which now has some control over the local business.
The local business wants to continue to expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in
the business. Imagine that you have recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much
of this money would you be willing to invest in this business? The business promises a 300%
return on your investment.”

24

Because the North Korean sample was completed early in the research process,
the second treatment could not be implemented in this sample.
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In addition to the survey experimental question about their willingness to
invest their money, I also included a secondary measurement for trust by asking
the individuals how much they actually trust the business in the hypothetical.
The survey also included basic demographic questions and asked several
questions relating to prior investment experience, trust in others, and amount of
time spent with foreigners. The North Korean refugees were also asked about
North Korea specific information such as defection date, defection trail (which
countries they went through to reach South Korea), and their occupations in the
North. These questions provide a deeper look into which factors determine
investment behavior in individuals, and greatly enhance my ability to examine
and interpret the data.
Indian Sample Group:
The Indian sample used for this research consisted of 364 citizens of the
Republic of India (225 males and 139 females, average age: 29). Due to financial
and time related constraints, the Indian sample was surveyed through Amazon’s
Mechanical-Turk (MTurk) program.
MTurk is an online labor market that allows ‘employers’ to post jobs for
‘workers’ (MTurks) to complete. Each job, or task, is given a price tag, and the
large body of MTurks can browse potential tasks. The employer is able to specify
the type of individual that will be able to complete his or her task. The task that I
posted on MTurk was labeled as a simple and short survey that would reward
those who complete it with 15 cents. If workers chose to participate in the survey,
they were taken to an external webpage and were given questions relating to

15

basic demographic information and randomly assigned one of three hypothetical
business situations.25
Using MTurk as the vehicle for my survey was incredibly cheap,26 but may
carry with it unwanted effects. Recent studies have shown that the research
samples used through MTurk are relatively balanced demographically and that
they yield similar results to samples found through conventional methods.
However, these studies were done on the US MTurk user-base, and may not be
applicable to the Indian user-base. In addition, the fact that the Indian sample
was paid for taking the survey like had significant results on the experimental
outcomes. I ran a manipulation check on a small portion (65 individuals) of the
Indian sample, and tests indicate that only half of the subject pool actually
received the treatment.27 This is likely due to the fact that MTurk workers are paid
by the task, so they are heavily incentivized to finish quickly. Because the
treatments are only two additional sentences, many individuals in my sample
may have read them without internalizing them.
Indian Experimental Design:
Because of the financial limitations imposed by using MTurk, the survey
given to the Indian sample included only a portion of the questions included in
the survey given to the North Korean refugees. These questions regarded the

25

Testing indicated that outside of one variable (prior investment experience)
randomization was balanced. See analysis section for a discussion of this unbalanced
variable.
26
I received 364 surveys in one night for only 80 US dollars.
27
The text of the manipulation check can be found in Appendix C: Manipulation Check.
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basic demographic information that I thought would be important in evaluation my
experimental outcome.28
In addition to fewer questions, the survey given to the Indian sample had
one additional treatment. This second treatment was identical to the international
investment treatment except it indicated that the local business had received an
investment from a local, Indian firm (see below).
Treatment Hypothetical 2: Domestic Investment
“A local business has grown over the last two years. During that time this business received a
large investment from another Indian firm, which now has some control over the local business.
The local business wants to continue to expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in
the business. Imagine that you have recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much
of this money would you be willing to invest in this business? The business promises a 300%
return on your investment.”

Using two slightly different treatment conditions is helpful in making
distinctions as to the scope of the resulting treatment effects. Our theory infers
that foreign investment, as embodied in our survey in the international investment
condition, should trigger higher levels of investment from survey respondents
than the no investment control and the local Indian investment treatment
conditions. By using both a domestic investment condition and an international
investment condition, we can better determine whether any observed effects are
the result of the presence of investment in general, or of foreign investment
specifically.
3. Experimental Results

28

The text of this survey can be found in Appendix C.
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Because two different survey designs were used in this experiment, the
results for North Koreans and Indians are given separately. Though the survey
designs are slightly different, the results are still useful in drawing basic
conclusions about the plausibility of my theory.
3.A: North Korean Refugee Results:
Using a multiple regression analysis and a t-test we are able to see the
effect that foreign investment has on the North Korean refugee sample.
Surprisingly, the differences in the mean amount individuals were willing to invest
indicate that the presence of foreign investment actually deters potential
investors in the North Korean sample, which runs in stark contrast to my theory.
However, almost none of the statistics derived from the Korean sample are
statistically significant, likely because of the small sample size.
According to a comparison of means test (see Table 1), those who
received the treatment gave 18.5% of their inherited money as an investment as
opposed to the control group who paid 24.5%. While the results are not
statistically significant, a 20% decrease in willingness to pay is an interesting
treatment outcome.
Table 1: Comparison of means of investment between the two conditions. Korean Sample
Average Amount of Investment, as a percentage of what they were given
No Investment
International Investment
Variable
Mean %
Variable
Mean %
Invested
Invested
18.48485
Experimental
24.52381
Experimental
(4.809264)
investment
(5.303806)
investment
95% confidence
interval

[13.81256,
35.23506]

95% confidence
interval

[8.688699,
28.281]

n = 33
(Standard errors provided in parentheses)
t=.8217, not significant at the .05 level

n = 42
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Because testing indicated that there were no randomization imbalances in
the distribution of the hypotheticals, there is no need to control for other
coefficients. However, I also ran a series of four different regressions using
covariates that would likely play a role in predicting investment willingness (see
table 2 below). The treatment proved to have some effect on the amount of
money that people were willing to invest, decreasing the amount by nearly six
percent. Interestingly, this effect was negative, implying that if this sample is
indicative of the real population, then North Korean refugees are actually less
willing to invest in a company that has received foreign investment.
None of the other variables had this substantive of an effect, although the
individuals’ monthly income and perception of foreigners were statistically
significant factors. In creating these control variables, I expected them to have a
greater affect on the dependent variable than they actually had.
Table 2: Determinants of investment behavior, North Korean Sample
Effects on Amount of Investment, as a percentage of what they were given
Variable
Coefficients
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Intercept
24.52381***
21.54386*** 10.03279
7.721843
(4.8748977)
(6.804333)
(13.49992)
(18.95926)
Treatment (1) or Control
(0)

-6.038961
(7.349304)

-7.341398
(8.114497)

-6.115409
(8.123709)

-6.129182
(8.177135)

Monthly Income (Won)

---

.061601
(.042509)

-.078652*
(.04332)

.077424*
(.043672)

Perception of foreigners

---

---

5.977035*
(3.3358)

6.021813*
(3.381216)

Trust level in others

---

---

---

-2.371892
(4.667852)

n
2
R

75
0.0092

62
0.0447

61
0.0950

61
0.0992
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(Standard errors provided in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)

In the survey I also asked the individuals how well they felt they could trust
the businessman from the hypothetical.29 One would expect that this variable
would be positively correlated with the amount of money that individuals were
willing to invest in the business. However, after running a similar set of
regressions as above, except using this trust variable as the dependent variable,
it appears that the trust that individuals had in the businessman and their
willingness to invest were actually negatively correlated (see table 3 below). This
may suggest that instead of being xenophobic towards the businesses that had
received foreign investment, the refugees may have actually invested less money
because of a genuine distaste for foreign business. It is also interesting, but not
surprising, to see that individuals’ general trust levels (their trust levels of other
people in general) have a statistically significant affect on their trust levels
concerning the business in the hypothetical.
Table 3: Determinants of investment behavior, North Korean Sample

Variable
Intercept

29

Effects on Trust in the Businessman
Coefficients
(1)
(2)
(3)
2.697674***
2.858332*** 3.203406***
(.1637403)
(.232543)
(.4500387)

(4)
1.968944***
(.5942111)

See Appendix A: Question 1.b.
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Treatment (1) or Control
(0)

.1508104
(.2484879)

.0584648
(.274913)

.023987
(.278906)

.01733
(.2619864)

Monthly Income (Won)

---

-.0015856
(.0014447)

-.0019485
(.0014983)

-.0016545
(.0014108)

Perception of foreigners

---

---

-.0914616
(.111603)

-.107177
(.1049635)

Trust level in others

---

---

---

.4452311***
(.1506165)

n
2
R

76
0.0050

63
0.0447

62
0.0332

62
0.1617

(Standard errors provided in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)

Indian Results:
A series of t-tests comparing the mean amount invested by the control
group with each of the treatment groups reveals that the Indian reaction to
foreign and domestic investment is also unsupportive of my original hypothesis,
but in a different way (see tables 4, 5, and 6 below). The data show that the
existence of investment does nothing to mitigate mistrust and increase fiscal
relationships. Power analysis suggests that the Indian sample size is large
enough to confirm the null-hypothesis.
However, because the manipulation check I ran indicated that at least half
of the individuals in the Indian sample did not receive the treatment, these
findings do not necessarily disprove my theory. Unfortunately, the manipulation
check was only run on a small percentage of the total sample, so I am unable to
only evaluate those that received the treatment.
Table 4: Comparison of means of investment between control and international treatment
Average Amount of Investment, as a percentage of what they were given
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No Investment
Variable
Mean %
Invested
35.583333
Experimental
(2.338879)
investment
95% confidence
interval

[31.20212,
40.46455]

International Investment
Variable
Mean %
Invested
36.08333
Experimental
(2.379581)
investment
95%
confidence
interval

[31.37152,
40.79514]

n = 120
n = 120
(Standard errors provided in parentheses)
t=.0760, not significant at the .05 level

Table 5: Comparison of means of investment between control and domestic treatment
Average Amount of Investment, as a percentage of what they were given
No Investment
Domestic Investment
Variable
Mean %
Variable
Mean %
Invested
Invested
34.0
Experimental
35.583333
Experimental
(2.35623)
investment
(2.338879)
investment
95% confidence
interval

[31.20212,
40.46455]

95%
confidence
interval

[29.33443,
38.66557]

n = 120
n = 120
(Standard errors provided in parentheses)
t=.5627, not significant at the .05 level
Table 6: Comparison of means of investment between domestic and international
treatments
Average Amount of Investment, as a percentage of what they were given
Domestic Investment
International Investment
Variable
Mean %
Variable
Mean %
Invested
Invested
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Experimental
investment

34.0
(2.35623)

Experimental
investment

36.08333
(2.379581)

95% confidence
interval

[329.33443,
38.66557]

95%
confidence
interval

[31.37152,
40.79514]

n = 120
n = 120
(Standard errors provided in parentheses)
t=.6304, not significant at the .05 level

Tests for randomization imbalances indicated that the proportion of
individuals with prior investment experience was unevenly distributed in the
control and international treatment groups. In order to account for this I ran a
simple regression, controlling for prior investment experience. The relationship
was not statistically significant, and the imbalance should not have had any real
effect on the t-test results.
4: Implications and Policy Suggestions
Although the North Korean sample data was not statistically significant
and a failed manipulation calls into question the Indian data, my results are still
intriguing. The data may, with a more robust sample, indicate that among North
Korean refugees, the existence of foreign investment actually deters domestic
investment and lowers trust levels. This result certainly goes against my theory,
but may not be as counter-intuitive as it seems. These refugees had lives most of
their lives in the most secluded nation in the world, and while they were the ones
that decided to leave communist North Korea, they had likely been indoctrinated
by xenophobic policy for such a long time, that they still see something like
foreign investment as a threat or a warning sign. However, this unwillingness to
invest may also be a function of a genuine distaste for foreign involvement. This
could suggest that some countries, particularly those that have negative views
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concerning foreign influence, are less ready to import trust through increases in
FDI, while in other countries, FDI has little if any effect at all. My results are
unable to prove my hypothesis but are also too inconclusive to disprove it.
Further testing is necessary.
5: Quantitative Regression Analysis
Research Method and Model Selection:
My research method consists of a series of multi-variate OLS regression
models. Because my dependent variable (amount of investment) is continuous
and I need to control for a number of factors to determine the effect that my
independent variables (time out of the DPRK and time in the ROK) have on
investment, OLS regression analysis is the best method in testing my hypothesis.
I measured willingness to engage in free-market capitalism using two
variations of exposure to free-market ideology, time out of the DPRK and time in
the ROK. While these two measurements would seem to be similar, my testing
suggests that using time in the ROK leaves much of the refugees’ story untold
(see Table 1, Model 1). Most of the refugees have lived in ROK for only half the
time they have lived outside of DPRK, with most of the refugees living in at least
three “interim” countries during that time (see Appendix: Table 3). While these
countries, which include China, The Philippines, Russia, and Mongolia, are not
as capitalist as South Korea, living in them likely affected the fiscal behavior of
the refugees. My regression models indicate that time out of DPRK is a better
predictor of investment than time in ROK (see Appendix: Table 1, notes). While
my final model selection is relatively simple (see Table 1: Model 5), I ran a series
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of functional form tests to identify all possible non-linear relationships. My final
model uses the natural log of investment as my dependent variable and
quadratic functions for both “Timeout DPRK” (time out of DPRK, my main
independent variable) and “Interim” (the number of countries that the individual
traveled through before reaching ROK). No other quadratic functions were
statistically significant, and no interaction variables were statistically significant
and theoretically valid.
I also tested for multicolinearity and found that none of the variables were
correlated enough to cause any problems for my regression model (see
Appendix: Table 4). Likewise, my correlation test indicates that I am not
excluding any variables that would impact my model, and thus, any omitted
variable bias is a result of insufficient data, not variable exclusion. The model, as
a whole, has a reasonably high adjusted r-square (.33, see Appendix: Table 1,
Model 5), indicating that the ten variables I included are good predictors of
variation in investment. The standard error of the regression is also acceptably
low. My model fulfilled all three assumptions of least squares regression: the
errors are distributed with a mean of zero, investment and time out of DPRK are
independently and identically distributed, and there were no significant outliers in
the data (see Appendix: Figure 2).
Results:
My results indicate that the amount of time that individuals are out of the
DPRK environment has a substantial impact on their willingness to engage in
fiduciary transactions and thus, their willingness to engage in free-market
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capitalism. Using the natural log of the refugees’ investment amounts, my
regression model shows that the relationship between time out of the DPRK and
investment is quadratic. For the first few years that individuals are out of the
DPRK, every additional year increases the amount they invest by 33%. However,
this effect tails off and the relationship becomes slightly less positive as more
years are spent out of the DPRK. The significance of this impact is compounded
by the fact that most of the refugees spend seven years or more outside of the
DPRK before they arrive in the ROK. This coefficient is statistically significant at
the 95% level, so we can be quite confident that the relationship is not due to
chance.
The strong relationship between time out of the DPRK and investment is
not surprising. What is surprising is the extent to which time out of DPRK makes
an impact; 33% more investment for every additional year is not trivial, especially
when we consider the fact that the amount that an individual invests is capped off
at 100% of the money they receive. Essentially, the coefficients for time out of
DPRK tell us that the amount of money an individual is willing to invest will
double for every two-and-a-half additional years they have been out of DPRK’s
oppressive communist regime.
The control variables in my model give additional data that tells an
interesting story; in addition to time out of the DPRK, the number of countries that
an individual lives in or travels through before he/she arrives in the ROK and the
level of general trust that the individual has towards his/her neighbors are
substantively and statistically significant factors in determining their willingness to
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invest. The relationship between interim countries and investment is non-linear,
and suggests that investment goes up as the number of interim countries
increases (about 100% per year), but only to a certain point. Once an individual
has been to more than one country, that individual’s investment decreases by
almost 200% for every additional country they lived in or traveled through. The
relationship becomes less negative as the number of interim countries increases.
The implications of these results are hard to understand. While I have no
doubt that an individual’s experience while traveling from the DPRK to the ROK
has a substantial impact on their willingness to take part in an investment
relationship, the impact that my model suggests is so profound that I believe my
model is missing some important information. For example, it would be nice to
know which individual visited which countries so I could control for the respective
levels of capitalism in each of those countries. However, given the limitations in
my analysis, the coefficients for interim countries suggests that for individuals
who had only been to one or two countries, the effect that the DPRK’s
communism had on them was quickly mitigated. However, as individuals
travelled to more countries, they may have been jaded by the things that they
saw and participated in, which may cause them to develop a distaste for
capitalism, leading to lower levels of investment.
The impact that general trust has on investment behavior is more understandable
than the impact that interim countries had on investment; the more an individual
trusts the general population, the more likely they are to invest money. General
trust was measured on a five-point scale, and my results indicate that for every
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additional point in trust, there is a 50% decrease in the amount of money
invested. All other control variables were either not statistically significant or
substantively insignificant.
Limitations:
Two main issues limit this regression analysis, and subsequently my
results: omitted variable bias and small sample size. Because I am using primary
research to test my hypothesis, I am limited to the data that I collected from my
surveys, and while the surveys did catch important data, there are variables that I
would like to control for that I do not have data on. For example, I would like to
control for political orientation, but did not ask about that in the surveys (I was
told that politics were too sensitive to ask the refugees about). Also, as I
mentioned in the results section, it would also be nice to know exactly which
interim countries each individual lived in or visited. Because my regression model
does not include variables that likely have an impact on the amount of money an
individual would be willing to invest, my model likely suffers from omitted variable
bias.
My small sample size is also a concern. While my results are very
statistically significant, not all of the coefficients for the variables I included are at
an acceptable confidence level. This may be a result of non-existent
relationships, but it may also be because I did not have a large enough sample.
Internal Validity: The internal validity of my study is limited by two factors:
self-reporting bias and the use of investment as an indicator for a more capitalist
ideology. Like most surveys, it is likely that some of the answers given by the
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refugees were not truly representative of the truth. While subjects were assured
that their identities would remain anonymous, North Korean refugees are
typically (and understandably) paranoid about giving away personal information.
Some may also question the use of investment as an indicator for
capitalist ideology. This limitation is significant, as the crux of my results is based
off of the investment variable. However, I feel that the use of this variable is valid,
as the risks associated with investment act as a valid buffer against those who
are uncomfortable with risky fiduciary behavior, which is closely correlated with
an individual’s comfort with capitalism.
External Validity: Recently, sharp increases in North Korean studies have
made the known refugee population in South Korea somewhat of a valuable
resource for research. Because of the difficulty in recruiting these refugees, I
chose to partner with Saejowi-TOOK, a prominent Seoul-based NGO focused on
promoting Korean reunification and refugee assimilation.30 Partnering with TOOK
likely had some effects on the type of subjects that are observed in the
experiment. Because the entire sample consisted of TOOK constituents, it is not
a random sample. Thus, my results may not be representative of the North
Korean refugee population as a whole.
Conclusions:
My results tell an interesting narrative. The amount of time that individuals
have been out of the DPRK does have a substantial impact on their willingness
to invest, but that investment also depends on the number of countries that
individuals lived in or travelled through before coming to the ROK. Certainly, this
30A

description of Saejowi-TOOK and their goals can be found at saejowi.org

29

suggests that the factors impacting an individual’s economic ideology are
nuanced and complicated. However, my results are strong enough to support my
hypothesis that exposure to free-market capitalism promotes a transition away
from communist economic ideologies to capitalism. These results are not
altogether unsurprising and should be useful in determining how to help North
Korean refugees adapt to their new environment. Currently, the refugees are
treated as an analogous whole when they arrive in the ROK, but by focusing
free-market classes and training on individuals who have only recently defected
from the DPRK, ROK government institutions and NGOs may be more effective
and impactful.

Appendix A: Hypothetical Text
Control Hypothetical:
A local business has grown over the last two years. The business wants to
continue to expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in the business.
Imagine that you have recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How
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much of this money would you be willing to invest in this business? The business
promises a 300% return on your investment.

Treatment Hypothetical 1: International Investment
A local business has grown over the last two years. During that time this
business received a large investment from an international firm, which now has
some control over the local business. The local business wants to continue to
expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in the business. Imagine
that you have recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much of this
money would you be willing to invest in this business? The business promises a
300% return on your investment.

Treatment Hypothetical 2: International Investment
A local business has grown over the last two years. During that time this
business received a large investment from another Indian firm, which now has
some control over the local business. The local business wants to continue to
expand and is looking for individuals willing to invest in the business. Imagine
that you have recently inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much of this
money would you be willing to invest in this business? The business promises a
300% return on your investment.
Investment Question:
How much of your money are you willing to invest in this business?
100 ~ 5,000 Dollars
5,001 ~ 10,000 Dollars
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10,001 ~ 15,000 Dollars
15,001 ~ 20,000 Dollars
20,001 ~ 25,000 Dollars
25,001 ~ 30,000 Dollars
30,001 ~ 35,000 Dollars
35,001 ~ 40,000 Dollars
40,001 ~ 45,000 Dollars
45,001 ~ 50,000 Dollars
I do not want to invest any money.
Trust Question:
How do you feel about this business?
A) I strongly trust it.
B) I trust it.
C) Nuetral
D) I do not trust it.
E) I strongly do not trust it.
Appendix B: North Korean Sample Survey
Korean Version:

통계조사 (북한
북한 이탈주민)
이탈주민
(해당사항에
해당사항에 X 표시해주십시오
표시해주십시오)
해주십시오
연령
결혼여부 (현재
현재)
현재
가족월평균
가족월평균 소득
종교
남한입국시기
북한이탈 이후
체류국가

만__________세(현재)

성별

1. 남성

2. 여성

1. 기혼 (결혼 등기했음)
2. 동거
3. 이혼
4. 미혼
5. 사별
6. 기타________________
 현재 남한에서 살 고 있는 상태를 말씀해주십시오
___________만원
1. 기독교
5. 없음
_____년_________월

2. 천주교
3. 불교
4. 무교
6. 기타______________
(최초
최초)북한이탈시기
최초 북한이탈시기 _______년_________월

1. 중국
2. 몽골
3. 러시아
4. 태국
5. 캄보디아
6. 베트남
7. 라오스
9. 기타______________
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북한에서의 학력

남한에서의 학력
5.
현재 고용 상태
북한에서의 고향

북한에서의 직업

1. 인민학교 중퇴
2. 인민학교 졸업
3. 고등중학교 중퇴
4. 고등중학교 졸업
5. 대학교 중퇴
6. 대학교 졸업
7. 기타________
1.
3.
5.
7.
1.
4.
1.
5.
9.
1.
5.

검정고시 (중학교)
고등학교 중퇴
일반대학교 졸업
재학
자영업
2. 회사원
학생

5. 은퇴

2.
4.
6.
8.

검정고시 (고등학교)
고등학교 졸업
사이버대학교 졸업
기타______________________

3. 무직
4. 아르바이트
6. 주부
7. 기타________

평양시
2. 자강도
3. 평안남도
4. 평안북도
양강도
6. 함경남도
7. 함경북도
8. 강원도
황해남도
10. 황해북도
11. 기타___________
노동자
2. 농민
3. 교육
4. 군인
주부
6. 학생
7. 당기관
8. 기타__________

설문조사
북한 이탈주민)
설문조사 (북한
이탈주민

1a. 어떤 회사가 지난 2 년간 성공을 하였습니다.
하였습니다 그리고 그 회사에서 귀하께 투자를 권유합니다.
권유합니다
만약 귀하께서 상속을 5 천 만원 받았다면 그 회사에 얼마를 투자하겠습니까?
투자하겠습니까 만약 투자를 한다면
3 배의 수익을 약속 한다고 합니다.
합니다
1b. 어떤 회사가 지난 2 년간 성공을 하였습니다.
하였습니다 그 동안 그 회사는 외국기업의 투자를 받았습니다.
받았습니다
그리고 투자한 외국기업은 그 회사에 영향력을 가지게 되었습니다.
되었습니다 그 회사가 귀하께 투자를
권유합니다.
권유합니다 만약 귀하께서 상속을 5 천 만원 받았다면 그 회사에 얼마를 투자하겠습니까?
투자하겠습니까 만약
투자를 한다면 3 배의 수익을 약속 한다고 합니다.
합니다

가. 귀하는 얼마를 투자하실 생각이십니까?
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫

10만원 ~ 500만원
501만원 ~ 1000만원
1001만원 ~ 1500만원
1501만원 ~ 2000만원
2001만원 ~ 2500만원
2501만원 ~ 3000만원

⑫

3001만원 ~ 3500
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⑫

3501

~ 4000

⑫

4001

~ 4500

21 4501

~ 5000
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나. 귀하는 이 회사에 대해 어떻게 생각을 하십니까?
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
2. 만약 이익금이 생기면 그 돈으로 무엇을 하시겠습니까?
하시겠습니까
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
3. 귀하는 주식이나 부동산에 투자해본 적이 있습니까?
있습니까
⑫
⑫
⑫ 없지만 앞으로 계획을 가지고 있다

4. 귀하께서 투자(부동산
투자 부동산,
부동산 주식등)
주식등 경험이 있다면 투자에 대해 어떻게 생각을 하십니까?
하십니까
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
5. 귀하는 소득에 얼마를 저축하십니까?
저축하십니까
______%
6. 귀하는 소득에 얼마를 투자하십니까?
투자하십니까
______%
7. 귀하는 투자에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?
생각하십니까
⑫ 매우 안전하다
⑫ 대체로 안전하다
⑫ 보통이다
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⑫
⑫

대체로 안전하지 않다
전혀 안전하지 않다

8. 만약에 귀하의 친구나 아는 사람이 돈 800 만원을 빌려달라고 한다면 어떻게 하실 건가요?
건가요
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫

빌려 주고 싶어도 돈이 없어서 못 빌려 준다

9. 만약에 귀하의 친구의 친구(귀하가
친구 귀하가 모르는 사람)가
사람 가 돈 800 만원을 빌려달라고 한다면 귀하는
빌려줄 것인가요?
것인가요
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫

빌려 주고 싶어도 돈이 없어서 못 준다

10. 귀하는 외국인과 대화를 얼마나 자주 합니까?
합니까
⑫

한다

⑫

한다

⑫

한다

⑫

한다

⑫

하지않는다

11. 귀하는 한국에 입국 한 후 몇 번이나 외국을 방문했습니까?
방문했습니까
________번
12. 귀하는 외국인들이 자신과 얼마나 다르다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫ 매우 다르다
⑫ 조금 다르다
⑫ 보통이다
⑫ 별로 다르지 않다
⑫ 전혀 다르지 않다
13. 법이 귀하의 일상 생활에 얼마나 중요하다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫ 매우 중요하다
⑫ 조금 중요하다
⑫ 보통이다
⑫ 별로 중요하지 않다
⑫ 전혀 중요하지 않다

14. 법이 귀하의 행동에 영향이 얼마나 큽니까?
큽니까
⑫
⑫
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⑫
⑫
⑫
15. 만약 다음과 같은 상황이 벌어진다면 경찰에
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조치를 취할 것입니까?
것입니까
가. 도둑을 맞았을 때?
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 할 것이다
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 하지 않을 것이다
가. 귀하께서는 이웃에 강도 침입을 목격 했을 때?
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 할 것이다
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 하지 않을 것이다
가. 사업상 다른 사람이 계약을 위반 했을 때?
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 할 것이다
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 하지 않을 것이다
가. 다른 사람이 폭행을 당하는 것을 목격했을 때?
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 할 것이다
경찰에 신고하거나 법적인 조처를 하지 않을 것이다

16. 귀하는 귀하에게 불리한 법이라도 지킬 생각이 있습니까?
있습니까
⑫ 많이 있다
⑫ 조금 있다
⑫ 보통이다
⑫ 별로 없다
⑫ 많이 없다
17. 귀하는 귀하의 이웃이 그자신에게
그자신에게 불리한 법이라도 지킬 생각이 있다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫ 많이 있다
⑫ 조금 있다
⑫ 보통이다
⑫ 별로 없다
⑫ 많이 없다
18. 일반적으로 귀하는 다른 사람들을 신뢰할 수 있다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫

로

⑫

19. 북한인과 남한인들 중에 누구를 더 많이 신뢰할 수 있다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫ 북한인
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⑫
⑫

남한인
동일하게 신뢰할 수 있다고 생각한다

20. 귀하가 한국의 법률 시스템을 신뢰할 수 있다고 생각합니까?
생각합니까
⑫ 완전히 신뢰할 수 있다
⑫ 대체로 신뢰할 수 있다
⑫ 보통이다
⑫ 대체로 신뢰할 수 없다
⑫ 완전히 신뢰할 수 없다
21. 귀하는 귀하의 생활에 만족합니까?
만족합니까
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
⑫
22. 귀하의 삶이 앞으로 개선될 것을 기대합니까?
기대합니까
⑫ 네
⑫ 아니오

Appendix C: Indian Sample Survey
1. Please indicate your gender.
A. Male
B. Female
2. Please type in your age (in years).
3. Please type in your family’s monthly income (in Indian Rupee).
4. In general, how well do you think other people can be trusted?
A. People can be perfectly trusted
B. People can usually be trusted
C. Neutral
D. People can usually not be trusted
E. People can absolutely not be trusted
5. What level of schooling have you completed?
A. Did not finish primary school
B. Finished primary school
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C. Did not finish secondary school
D. Finished secondary school
E. Did not finish college
F. Finished college
6. Hypothetical
7. Have you ever invested in a business before?
A. Yes
B. No
C. No, but I plan to in the near future
8. If you have invested in a business before, how was the experience?
A. Good
B. Neutral
C. Bad
Manipulation Check:
On the previous page you were told about a local business that was looking for
investments.

Form what you remember, did the local business receive any investments form

other firms?
A. No, it did not
B. Yes, from another Indian firm
C. Yes, from an international firm

Appendix D: Regression Data
Table 1: Predictors of Investment
Dependent Variables: Percentage of money invested (Model 4) and Natural Log of
Percentage of Money Invested (Models 1-3 and 5)
(Model 1)
(Model 2)
(Model 3)
(Model 4)
(Model 5)
Regressors
ln(Invest)
ln(Invest)
ln(Invest)
Invest
ln(Invest)
Timeout DPRK

0.000497
(0.0367)

0.418***
(0.139)

1.360**
(0.607)

0.327**
(0.155)
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TimeoutSq
Age
Income
Interim

-0.0262***
(0.00876)
0.0209
(0.0127)
0.00707***
(0.00177)
-0.672***
(0.165)

InterimSq
InterimCu
GTrust
Female
Marriage
Christian
Unemployed
Northern
Province
Timein ROK
Constant

-0.403***
(0.130)
0.0237
(0.440)
-0.295
(0.367)
-0.282
(0.359)
-0.768
(0.576)
-0.432
(0.524)
0.0169
(0.0470)
2.166**
(0.832)

-0.524
(0.421)
-1.138**

-0.0842**
(0.0392)
0.0420
(0.0529)
0.0223**
(0.00903)
12.46***
(4.414)
-9.401***
(3.319)
1.758**
(0.771)
-1.421**
(0.557)
-2.119
(1.630)
-1.482
(1.407)
-1.142
(1.614)
-1.523
(2.042)
-2.428

-0.0205**
(0.00964)
0.0145
(0.0131)
0.00625***
(0.00208)
3.219***
(1.049)
-2.689***
(0.786)
0.532***
(0.181)
-0.468***
(0.139)
-0.408
(0.328)
-0.280
(0.304)
-0.303
(0.387)
-0.665
(0.526)
-0.936

(0.469)

(0.514)

(2.529)

(0.645)

1.204
(0.979)

1.635*
(0.823)

1.206
(4.199)

1.137
(1.009)

0.0234**
(0.0110)
0.00678**
(0.00270)
3.020**
(1.296)
-2.604***
(0.934)
0.527**
(0.204)
-0.440***
(0.149)
-0.372
(0.436)
-0.205
(0.318)
-0.268
(0.383)
-0.673
(0.659)
-0.556

0.00140
(0.00144)
3.192***
(1.006)
-2.406***
(0.739)
0.448***
(0.159)
-0.405***
(0.130)
-0.676*
(0.356)
-0.187
(0.272)

Observations
40
39
44
39
39
R-squared
0.418
0.479
0.456
0.482
0.550
Adjusted R0.312
0.239
0.269
0.213
0.330
squared
3.287
0.778
0.741
3.031
0.730
SER
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Description
of variables can be found in Table 2.
Model Summary: Model 1 shows the relationship between my alternative, main
independent variable, Timein ROK. I included this model to show that this variable was
not significant. Model 2 shows the need to use a quadratic form for my main
independent variable, Timeout DPRK, by excluding the squared term. Model 3 shows
the impact of removing tow of the least significant variables, Age and Christian. Models 4
and 5 show the difference between using the natural log of the dependent variable,
Invest. Model 5 is the final model.
Table 2: Variable Descriptions
Variable
Investment

Variable Name Description
Investment
This variable measured the percentage of their
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hypothetical 5 Million Korean Won ($50,000)
inheritance that they were willing to invest in the
South Korean business.
This variable measures the amount of time, in years,
Time Spent in
that the individual refugee had been in the ROK at the
ROK
Timein ROK
time of the survey.
This variable measures the amount of time, in years,
Time Since
Timeout
that the individual refugee had been out of the DPRK
Defecting from
DPRK
at the time of the survey.
DPRK
This variable measures the age, in years, of the
Age
Age
refugee at the time of the survey.
This variable represents whether the refugee was
Gender
Female
female (1=yes, 0=no).
This variable represents whether the refugee was
Marital Status
Marriage
married (1=yes, 0=no).
This variable measured the refugee’s monthly income
in Korean Won.
Montly Income
Income
This variable represents whether the refugee was
Religion
Christian
Christian (1=yes, 0=no).
This variable measures the number of countries the
refugee lived in or travelled through before reaching
Number of Interim
Interim
the ROK.
Countries
Employment
This variable represents whether the refugee was
Status
Unemployed
unemployed (1=yes, 0=no).
This variable measures the level of trust that the
refugee has towards his/her neighbors in general.
General Trust of
Trust levels were measured on a five-point scale, 1
Nieghboors
Gtrust
being the highest level of trust and 5 being the lowest.
This variable represents whether the refugee was
from the four Northern Provinces in the DPRK
North Korean
Northern
(Pyongan-bukdo, Chagang-do, Yangang-do,
Hometown
Province
Hamgyong-namdo, Hamgyong-bukdo) (1=yes, 0=no).
Notes: All data came from a survey conducted by the author in South Korea (May
2011). Survey Transcript will be provided upon request.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Investment
Timeout DPRK
Timeout2
Age
Income
Interim
Interim2
Interim3

Observation
s
75
58
58
71
67
80
80
80

Mean
0.7663059
7.796379
78.12785
42.09859
98.08955
1.5375
2.9875
7.1625

Std. Dev.
0.8497917
4.201025
67.81799
11.2328
93.84477
0.7946618
3.473202
15.25931

Minimum
0
0.66
0.4356
18
0
0
0
0

Maximum
2.397895
15.75
248.0625
73
600
5
25
125
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GTrust
Female
Marriage
Christian
Unemployed
Northern
Province

79
75
76
75
78

2.797468
0.84
0.2763158
0.6666667
0.1538462

0.8378811
0.3690748
0.4501462
0.474579
0.3631365

1
0
0
0
0

5
1
1
1
1

80
0.8875
0.3179742 0
Notes: Description of variables can be found in Table 2.

Inv
In
1.0
0.0 1.0

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients
Out Age Fem Mar
Inc
Chst

Int

1

Unep NProv

Investment
Timein ROK
Timeout
DPRK
0.0 0.6 1.0
Age
0.0 0.2 -0.1 1.0
Female
-0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0
Marriage
0.0 0.4 0.2 -0.1
0.1
1.0
Income
0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.3
-0.2
0.2 1.0
Christian
0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2
0.0
0.0 0.1
1.0
Interim
-0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
0.1
-0.1 0.1
0.1
1.0
Unemployed
0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
0.0
0.0 0.0
-0.2
-0.4
1.0
Northern
Province
0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2
-0.1
-0.1 0.0
0.3
0.0
0.1
1.0
Notes: Correlation coefficients are measure on a scale from -1 to 1, rounded to the
nearest tenth. Description of variables can be found in Table 2.
Figure 1: Investment Question
A local business has grown over the last two years. During that time this
business received a large investment from an international firm, which now has some
control over the local business. The local business wants to continue to expand and is
looking for individuals willing to invest in the business. Imagine that you have recently
inherited 50,000 dollars from a relative. How much of this money would you be willing to
invest in this business? The business promises a 300% return on your investment.
How much of your money are you willing to invest in this business?
100 ~ 5,000 Dollars
5,001 ~ 10,000 Dollars
10,001 ~ 15,000 Dollars
15,001 ~ 20,000 Dollars
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20,001 ~ 25,000 Dollars
25,001 ~ 30,000 Dollars
30,001 ~ 35,000 Dollars
35,001 ~ 40,000 Dollars
40,001 ~ 45,000 Dollars
45,001 ~ 50,000 Dollars
I do not want to invest any money.

Figure 2: Scatterplot Matrix (for outliers)
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Notes: Description of variables, including units of measurement, can be found in Table
2. I did not exclude any outliers. However, I did consider excluding the observation that
has the very high monthly income (almost $6,000 a month), but because it did not
impact my results, I decided to keep it in my analysis.
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